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The emotional attentional blink (EAB), also known as emotion-induced blindness, refers
to a phenomenon in which the brief appearance of a task-irrelevant, emotionally arousing
image captures attention to such an extent that individuals cannot detect target stimuli for
several hundred ms after the emotional stimulus. The EAB allows for mental chronometry
of stimulus-driven attention and the time needed to disengage and refocus goal-directed
attention. In this review, we discuss current evidence for the mechanisms through which
the EAB occurs. Although the EAB shares some similarities to both surprise-induced
blindness (SiB) and other paradigms for assessing emotion-attention interactions, it
possesses features that are distinct from these paradigms, and thus appears to
provide a unique measure of the influence of emotion on stimulus-driven attention.
The neural substrates of the EAB are not completely understood, but neuroimaging
and neuropsychological data suggest some possible neural mechanisms underlying the
phenomenon. The importance of understanding the EAB is highlighted by recent evidence
indicating that EAB tasks can detect altered sensitivity to disorder relevant stimuli in
psychiatric conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
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Rapid detection of emotionally salient events is critical for sur-
vival. However, given capacity limits on attention and awareness,
the ability of emotional stimuli to preferentially capture atten-
tion comes with a cost. Specifically, if attentional resources are
drawn to an emotional stimulus, there will be less processing
capacity available for other stimuli. Although several different
tasks have been used to explore the effects of emotional stim-
uli on spatial and selective attention, recent studies using more
novel paradigms have begun to provide insights into the time
course of attentional capture to emotionally salient stimuli and
the impact of this capture on the ability to perceive subse-
quent stimuli. In this review, we discuss the emotional attentional
blink (EAB) as a model paradigm for understanding stimulus-
driven influences of emotion on attention. We contrast the EAB
to other paradigms for studying emotion-attention interactions
and review current neuroimaging and neuropsychological data
for the mechanisms underlying the EAB. We conclude with a
review of emerging evidence on the potential utility of the EAB
as a measure of attentional biases to concern-relevant stimuli in
psychopathology.
INITIAL STUDIES OF THE EAB
The attentional blink (AB) paradigm measures the temporal
capacity limits of attention (Dux and Marois, 2009). In the stan-
dard AB task, identification of a first target (T1) during a rapid
serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream transiently impairs the
ability to detect a second target (T2) (see Figure 1A). The refrac-
tory period during which T2 cannot be detected is labeled the AB.
The EAB involves the presentation of task-irrelevant emotional
distractors during an RSVP target detection task (see Figure 1B).
In this paradigm, emotional distractors elicit an AB, even though
the distractor stimuli are not targets (Arnell et al., 2004; Most
et al., 2005). This type of emotion-induced AB indexes the ability
of emotional stimuli to rapidly capture attention.
Most et al. (2005) provided an early description of the EAB,
and coined the term emotion-induced blindness. On each trial,
they had participants search for a single rotated image depict-
ing a landscape or building within an RSVP stream of upright
landscape or architectural photos. At 200 (lag 2) or 800 (lag 8)ms
prior to the target, a distractor appeared consisting of either a neg-
ative, neutral, or scrambled image. Accuracy was impaired when
a target followed a negative distractor at lag 2 relative to lag 8.
Critically, performance was substantially worse following the neg-
ative distractors than the neutral distractors at lag 2. The EAB
could not be easily accounted for by factors such as the color of
the negative distractors because the emotionally salient distrac-
tors caused a robust AB relative to scrambled distractor images
that were created by rearranging and blurring the negative images.
Examination of the time course of the EAB indicates that the
effect can be seen as early as lag 1 (Most and Junge, 2008), but
declines substantially as one moves longer than lag 2, such that it
is progressively weaker at lag 4 and lag 6. The effect is typically
gone by lag 8, and indeed there may be a modest enhancement
of target detection at lag 8 (Ciesielski et al., 2010). Overall, the
length of the emotion-induced blindness is roughly similar to the
standard AB, which typically lasts for approximately 200–500ms
(Raymond et al., 1992).
The EAB is not limited to negative or aversive images. In
a number of studies, we have observed that erotica induce an
EAB that is often larger than that produced by aversive images
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Schematic of a standard AB task in which the goal is to report the identity of two words printed in green. (B) Example of an EAB trial in which
participants must detect a rotated image in the presence of a disgust distractor.
(Most et al., 2007; Ciesielski et al., 2010). Such findings suggest
that arousal rather than valence is a critical feature in gen-
erating attentional capture. The effect also occurs with verbal
stimuli. Some of the first published demonstrations of an EAB
effect utilized a verbal RSVP task in which participants had to
detect words printed in a specific color (Arnell et al., 2004, 2007;
Mathewson et al., 2008). In this paradigm, emotionally arousing
and taboo distractor words produced an AB relative to neutral
words when a color target occurred soon after an emotionally
arousing distractor word.
The current meaning or value of the distractor stimulus can
modulate the ability of a stimulus to cause an EAB. Smith et al.
(2006) demonstrated that aversively conditioned stimuli cause a
blink and Piech et al. (2009) showed that current motivational
state of the participant can modulate the extent of an EAB (e.g.,
food stimuli induced a greater EAB when subjects were fasting).
These modulations of the EAB appear to be relatively modest
compared to the large magnitude of attentional capture by aver-
sive or erotic pictures, but may enable use of the EAB as a measure
of dynamic changes in stimulus valuation. This sensitivity to
changes in stimulus value suggests the potential utility of the
EAB as an objective marker of the effects of therapeutic inter-
ventions in psychiatric conditions in which stimulus-reinforcer
associations potently drive behavior.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER EMOTION-ATTENTION
INTERACTIONS
The EAB provides a unique measure of attentional capture by
emotional stimuli. Although several paradigms have been com-
monly used to study emotion-attention interactions, none of
these paradigms appear to measure the same phenomenon as the
EAB, or if they do, they lack the robustness of the EAB effect.
Methodologically, the most similar paradigm to the EAB involves
a variant of the standard AB in which a T1 target is followed by
an emotional stimulus presented as the T2 target. This variant
allows examination of the extent to which emotional stimuli can
break through the refractory period of the AB. Critically, emo-
tionally salient T2s emerge from the standard AB window more
readily than their neutral counterparts (Keil and Ihssen, 2004;
Anderson, 2005; Milders et al., 2006). For instance, in AB studies
by Anderson and Phelps (Anderson and Phelps, 2001; Anderson,
2005) in which subjects had to detect words written in a specific
color, the T2 was more likely to be detected if it consisted of an
emotionally salient word instead of a neutral word. This effect
occurred even though the meaning of the emotional and neutral
words was irrelevant to the instructed task, which only required
subjects to attend to each word’s color. This type of enhanced
detection of emotional T2 stimuli has also been observed for emo-
tional facial expressions, with highly anxious individuals showing
enhanced detection of fearful vs. happy faces presented at T2 (Fox
et al., 2005).
The preferential detection of emotional T2 stimuli in the stan-
dard AB and the ability of emotional stimuli to capture attention
in the EAB indicate prioritized processing of emotional stim-
uli. However, the two paradigms differ in terms of the processes
being measured. The standard AB with emotional T2 charac-
terizes preferential target detection under a condition of limited
attentional resources, whereas the EAB focuses on the impact of
attentional capture on the processing of other stimuli. In par-
ticular, these two paradigms differ in the extent to which they
depend on distinct types of attention. Although attention may
be carved at many joints, a commonly accepted categorization
divides attention into goal-directed (top-down) and stimulus-
driven (bottom-up) attention (Egeth and Yantis, 1997; Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002). Goal-directed attention allows us to volun-
tary select stimuli from the environment whereas stimulus-driven
attention reflects the ability of highly salient items to capture
attention. In the standard AB the emotional T2 stimulus is task
relevant, and congruent with goal-directed attention to colored
words. By contrast, the EAB has the hallmarks of a stimulus-
driven, bottom-up engagement of attention in that attention is
captured even though the emotional stimuli are task irrelevant.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 151 | 2
McHugo et al. The emotional attentional blink
We see little evidence of a goal-directed ability to overcome the
EAB effect even when people receive monetary rewards for good
performance (accurately detecting targets), and regardless of sub-
jects’ evaluation of how hard they try to do the task (Most
et al., 2007). Of note, prior exposure to and expectation of highly
arousing emotional distractors does not eliminate their ability to
capture attention (Arnell et al., 2007).
In considering other tasks that can be used to examine
emotion-attention interactions, we note that most of these
paradigms either reflect a preferential detection of emotional
stimuli, or the ability of emotional stimuli to interfere with
goal-directed attention. As such, the literature often parallels the
divide between standard AB with emotional T2 and the EAB.
For instance, several tasks including backward masking and con-
tinuous flash suppression provide instances in which emotional
stimuli are preferentially detected. In backwardmasking, an emo-
tional stimulus, typically a face, is presented very briefly and
followed immediately by a masking stimulus such as a neutral
face (Esteves and Ohman, 1993; Pessoa et al., 2005). Emotional
expressions can be detected with even short presentation times
(10–20ms). Continuous flash suppression is a technique in which
awareness for a stimulus presented to one eye is suppressed while
visual noise is presented to the other eye (Tsuchiya and Koch,
2005). Suppressed fearful faces appear to reach awareness more
readily than happy or neutral faces (Yang et al., 2007; Tsuchiya
et al., 2009). These tasks differ from the EAB primarily in that
they are not typically used to measure the effect of emotion on
awareness for a subsequent stimulus.
By contrast, the emotional Stroop measures the extent to
which emotional information interferes with processing of non-
emotional features of stimuli. This variant of the classic Stroop
effect examines the extent to which individuals are slower to name
the color of emotional words than neutral words (Williams et al.,
1996). There is an element of stimulus-driven attention in that
the semantic meaning of the word interferes with attention to the
color of the word even though word meaning is incidental to the
task. To minimize this distraction, subjects must use top-down
attentional control to overcome emotional interference. Because
it measures the extent to which emotion interferes with task rel-
evant processing, the emotional Stroop can be argued to have at
least a superficial similarity to the EAB. However, the emotional
Stroop paradigm differs from the EAB in three critical ways. First,
there is never a failure to see the stimulus in the emotional Stroop
paradigm because the distracting emotional information and the
goal relevant stimulus are not spatially or temporally dissocia-
ble. Second, unlike the EAB, in which individual stimuli capture
attention, emotional Stroop effects do not show an individual
stimulus effect. That is, the emotional Stroop effect is seen when
entire blocks of words are threat related, but is absent when emo-
tional words and neutral words are presented in a mixed block
(Algom et al., 2004). Algom and colleagues argue that this pattern
of results reflects a generic slowing rather than a classic selec-
tive attention mechanism. Finally, at least to date, there is little
evidence that the EAB can be overcome by the application of
top-down control, although it may be possible to modestly alter
the magnitude of the EAB based on knowledge about the target
(Most et al., 2005).
The effects of emotional stimuli on attention have also been
examined in the context of visual search tasks. In such tasks, an
emotional target (e.g., spiders) is detected faster in an array of
neutral images than a neutral image is detected in an array of
emotional targets, especially at larger matrix sizes (Ohman et al.,
2001). Typically, this is attributed to a pop-out effect for the emo-
tional stimuli that leads to faster detection. However, it is also
possible that a slowed detection of the neutral stimuli among
a matrix of threat images is due to attentional capture caused
by one or more of the threat images, which transiently disrupts
the ability to perceive the neutral stimuli. Unfortunately, as typ-
ically applied by researchers (without the addition of baseline
measures of performance in the absence of any emotional stim-
uli), it is unclear to what extent findings from the visual search
task reflect speeded detection of emotional stimuli, interference
in detection of neutral stimuli, or both (Lipp, 2006). In con-
trast, the EAB paradigm allows for independent measurement of
the distinct effects of emotional and neutral distractors on target
detection.
The dot probe task (Macleod et al., 1986; Mogg and Bradley,
1999) is another popularmeasure for assessing the effects of emo-
tion on attention. The task measures the extent to which attention
is drawn to or away from a spatial location where an emotional
cue (typically a threat face) has occurred by measuring whether
reaction times are faster when a target appears at a position con-
gruent or incongruent to the cue. However, unlike in the EAB,
there is no evidence that the emotional cue prevents awareness
of the target. Rather the emotional cue only delays the detec-
tion of the target, and this delay is extremely brief, often at the
level of 20ms or less, and the delay is not always observed in
non-clinical samples (Schmukle, 2005; Frewen et al., 2008). Thus,
while the dot probe task may capture an emotional impact on
attention, it appears too brief and weak to represent the same phe-
nomenon captured by the EAB, which can last for 100 s of ms,
and is seen consistently in the healthy young adult samples that
we have studied thus far.
In sum, the EAB phenomenon differs conceptually from com-
mon emotion-attention task paradigms and allows measurement
of attentional capture in a clear manner that is not contaminated
by other aspects of responsiveness to emotional stimuli. Because
the EAB is robust even within healthy (non-clinical) individu-
als, it is well suited for studying emotion-attention interactions
and the neural substrates mediating these processes. Also of note,
while emotional stimuli are task relevant in emotion-attention
paradigms such as the standard AB, emotional Stroop, and visual
search paradigms, they are not task-relevant in the EAB. This
latter factor becomes important in determining precisely which
aspects of attention are influenced by emotion.
ATTENTIONAL CAPTURE AND STIMULUS-DRIVEN
ATTENTION
As noted above, emotion-attention interactions can be considered
in the context of goal-directed vs. stimulus-driven attention, with
the EAB showing the characteristics of stimulus-driven attention.
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) have proposed a model in which
goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention depend on largely
separable neural networks: a goal-directed dorsal frontoparietal
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attention network, including the frontal eye fields (FEF), and
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and a stimulus-driven ventral network
that includes the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and ventral
frontal cortex [including the anterior insula (AI) and lateral
frontal regions]. The standard AB is thought to primarily relate
to capacity limits to goal-directed attention. It is critically depen-
dent on attention being allocated to the first of two targets (T1,
T2) during the RSVP stream. By contrast, when the T1 is to
be ignored, the T2 is readily detected (Raymond et al., 1992).
According to two-stage bottleneck models of the AB, all stim-
uli in the RSVP stream undergo an initial stage of perceptual
and semantic processing (Chun and Potter, 1995). This stage has
a high capacity to process stimulus representations in parallel.
When target stimuli appear, they compete for a second stage, lim-
ited capacity process that enables awareness of the target. The first
stage representations are weak and susceptible to decay: failure to
detect T2 occurs if processing of the T1 in the limited capacity sec-
ond stage doesn’t complete before the stage 1 representation of T2
fades. Two-stage bottleneck models are supported by functional
magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) data. The correct detection
of targets during the AB has been linked to activation of the dor-
sal frontoparietal attention network in concert with primary and
higher order visual areas, whereas activation of sensory cortices
alone does not appear to be sufficient for conscious report of tar-
gets (Marois et al., 2000, 2004; Gross et al., 2004; Shapiro et al.,
2007; Williams et al., 2008).
Non-emotional, task-irrelevant distractors can also impair tar-
get detection during an RSVP stream, particularly if they share
perceptual or conceptual features with a target (Folk et al., 2002;
Barnard et al., 2004; Maki and Mebane, 2006). This “contin-
gent attentional capture” may be viewed as a hybrid condition in
which there is a goal-directed attention filter that allows certain
stimuli to capture attention. Contingent attentional capture has
been shown to recruit cortical areas consistent with the stimulus-
driven attentional network in concert with the dorsal attention
network (Serences et al., 2005), reflecting the dynamic interplay
of top-down and bottom-up processing in this paradigm.
Asplund and colleagues have recently characterized atten-
tional capture driven by irrelevant, non-contingent distractors
during RSVP (Asplund et al., 2010a,b). They found that novel,
unexpected distractors robustly impair target detection (termed
surprise-induced blindness, or SiB), but this capture effect lasts
for only one or two trials. This robust SiB effect was most
apparent at a distractor-target stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA)
of 390ms, and was subject to rapid habituation across trials.
Asplund et al. also identified a second variant of the SiB—
at a shorter distractor-target SOA (130ms) they detected a
longer-lasting but weaker capture effect; target detection was
impaired, but not to the extent it was during the first two tri-
als with a 390ms SOA. SiB differs from the standard AB not
only in its dependence on a task-irrelevant stimulus, but it is
also unaffected by placement of a blank immediately following
the surprise stimulus (a condition that typically attenuates the
standard AB). Neuroimaging evidence supports the notion that
the robust form of the SiB is distinct from the standard AB.
Activity in the TPJ, a region thought to be critical for reori-
enting attention in a stimulus-driven manner (Corbetta et al.,
2008), is increased on trials in which surprise distractors cap-
ture attention (Asplund et al., 2010b). By contrast, this area
is not commonly observed during more traditional AB tasks
(Marois et al., 2004).
Mechanistically, the EAB shares more in common with SiB
than either the standard AB or contingent attentional capture.
SiB and the EAB occur despite the task-irrelevance of the crit-
ical stimulus. They also both appear to be relatively automatic,
and largely outside of voluntary control. The persistence of EAB
and the weaker form of the SiB may be similar as well: experi-
ments using a verbal form of the EAB (Arnell et al., 2007) and
the weak form of the SiB suggest a decline of the effect after∼100
trials. Whether the EAB using aversive or erotic pictures dimin-
ishes after a similar number of repetitions remains to be seen,
as studies to date have generally used fewer than 100 emotional
stimuli for a given class of stimuli. The EAB and SIB also are sim-
ilar in terms of a lack of lag 1 sparing (Most and Junge, 2008;
Asplund et al., 2010a). Lag 1 sparing is a feature often found in
studies of the AB (and contingent attentional capture) in which
the blink is decreased if presentation of the T2 occurs in the serial
position immediately following the T1 (Chun and Potter, 1995).
The precise cause for lag 1 sparing is a source of debate, but most
explanations center on either the importance of a specific tem-
poral relationship between T1 and T2 (approximately 100ms) or
on the characteristics of the post-T1 stimulus (Dux and Marois,
2009). Lag 1 sparing is conceptually important in the AB litera-
ture, as the ability to explain this sparing has proven critical in
the evaluation of different models of the AB. The absence of lag
1 sparing in the EAB and SIB thus suggests that the EAB and SIB
involve mechanisms that are at least partially distinct from that of
the standard AB.
Despite their similar levels of endurance across trials the
weaker form of the SiB and the EAB differ dramatically in their
time course within a given trial. The lag-dependent time course
of the EAB more closely resembles the AB. Beginning at lag 2,
emotional distractors robustly capture attention and the effect
gradually returns to baseline (Ciesielski et al., 2010). Additionally,
SiB is more dependent upon contextual novelty. The weak lag
1 SiB disappeared when surprise distractors were presented as
frequently as the non-critical distractors (Asplund et al., 2010a).
However, the EAB still occurs when emotional critical distractors
are just as likely to appear as neutral critical distractors (Arnell
et al., 2007).
BOTTLENECK MODEL OF THE EAB
As noted previously, AB effects have often been explained with a
two-stage bottleneck model (Chun and Potter, 1995) in which a
target cannot be processed if the bottleneck stage is occupied with
other processing. Although such a model could explain the EAB,
in which an emotional distractor (like a T1 target) could occupy
a second stage bottleneck, Most, Wang and colleagues (Most
and Wang, 2011; Wang et al., 2012) have proposed an alterna-
tive possibility, in which emotional distractors generate increased
competition for perceptual resources during stage 1 perceptual
processing rather than limiting awareness at the central bottle-
neck stage (Figure 2). In thismodel, a robust representation of the
emotional stimulus actively inhibits spatiotemporally adjacent
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FIGURE 2 | Two stage bottleneck model of the emotional attentional
blink with emphasis on stage 1 competition. Each stimulus in the RSVP
stream is processed by stage 1 perceptual resources in parallel. The time at
which a stimulus enters stage 1 processing is determined by its presentation
order in the RSVP stream. (A) If stage 1 processing of a task irrelevant
emotional stimulus and the target overlap (highlighted in blue), their
representations compete for selection into stage 2 processing. When the
emotional stimulus is sufficiently strong (arousing), the strength of its
representation combined with its appearance prior to T1 during the RSVP
stream enables it to out-compete the target stimulus for entry into stage 2
processing. Despite being goal relevant, the representation of the target
fades before the stage 2 processing of the emotional stimulus is completed
(highlighted in red). (B) By contrast, if the target were to occur at a later lag,
such as lag 5, there will be less competition due to the reduced temporal
proximity to the emotional stimulus, and the target representation can last
beyond the end of the stage 2 processing of the emotional stimulus
(highlighted in red). In such a case the target would be able to enter stage 2
processing.
goal relevant stimulus representations. Most and Wang (2011)
hypothesized that if emotional distractors induce an EAB by
creating competition for first-stage perceptual resources, the dis-
tractors should interfere with target processing primarily when
the emotional distractor and target appear in the same spa-
tial location. By contrast, if the distractor caused an EAB even
when the target was at a different spatial location, it would
suggest that the EAB occurred at a later, central processing bot-
tleneck. To examine this possibility, they constructed a task in
which participants searched for a single target in either of two
simultaneously presented RSVP streams. Emotional and neutral
distractors could appear in the stream containing the target or
the other stream. Critically, the emotional distractors produced
an EAB only when they were presented in the stream containing
the target. These data are striking in that they suggest that the
EAB does not depend on a single central bottleneck, but rather
occurs at a spatially specific (and presumably) stage 1 processing
level. This finding further suggests that the mechanisms under-
lying the EAB are at least partly dissociable from those of the
standard AB: spatial selection is impaired during the AB (Jiang
and Chun, 2001), whereas it appears to be largely intact during
the EAB.
NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF THE EAB
Emotional stimuli elicit strong activation across the ventral visual
stream (Sabatinelli et al., 2010) and this emotional modulation
of visual processing is thought to be a key means by which emo-
tionally salient items capture attention (Vuilleumier, 2005). The
amygdala is robustly activated by emotional stimuli (Zald, 2003;
Sergerie et al., 2008) and has been posited to enhance activation of
higher order visual areas through its strong projections to visual
regions (Amaral et al., 2003; Freese and Amaral, 2005). Support
for the amygdala’s role in such a process has been demonstrated
for face processing in the fusiform gyrus (Vuilleumier et al., 2004),
although it is possible that the amygdala is less critical for this
modulation of other types of emotional stimuli.
If amygdala-driven persistence of the sensory representation
of emotional distractors is a key factor in their ability to gen-
erate an EAB, there should be: (1) increased amygdala activity
in response to emotional distractors when they capture atten-
tion, and (2) patients with amygdala lesions should exhibit a
decreased EAB. At present, data directly supporting these two
assertions remain lacking. Although a few studies have explored
the neural correlates of the EAB with fMRI, to date, no study has
specifically examined or reported amygdala activity in response
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to task-irrelevant emotional distractors when they do and do not
capture attention. Most et al. (2006) investigated the extent to
which amygdala activity in response to emotional distractors was
influenced by top-down attentional settings. As expected, neg-
atively valenced distractors elicited increased amygdala activity
when presented during an RSVP stream similar to that used to
study the EAB. However, the authors only examined activation
on trials in which no target was presented, leaving the impact
of this amygdala activation on attentional processing unclear.
Neuropsychological data suggest that the amygdala may not be
required for an EAB to occur. Our group recently examined
whether patients with unilateral amygdala damage exhibit an EAB
(Piech et al., 2011). We found that amygdala lesion patients,
regardless of the side of the lesion, displayed comparable EABs to
healthy controls for both negative and positive arousing distrac-
tors. Although it remains possible that the amygdala contralateral
to the lesion was able to produce an EAB, the lack of even a mild
decline in the frequency of the EAB following lesions to either
hemisphere is striking. To rule out the possible compensation of
the contralateral amygdala in producing an EAB, it would be help-
ful to determine whether patients with bilateral lesions show a
similar preservation of the EAB. Such a preservation would be
consistent with recent suggestions that there are multiple neu-
ral circuits by which emotional stimuli can influence attention
(Pessoa and Adolphs, 2011).
An alternate hypothesis for understanding the mechanisms
of the EAB is that emotional distractors capture attention by
interrupting top-down attentional settings through interactions
with the ventral attention network (Yamasaki et al., 2002) or
by direct modulation of region in the goal-directed attention
network (Pourtois et al., 2006). During attention tasks, the ven-
tral stimulus-driven attention network is deactivated, which is
thought to reflect a top-down filtering mechanism that helps
suppress processing of information that is likely to be irrele-
vant to current goals (Corbetta et al., 2008). This suppression
is interrupted by stimuli that attract attention. Findings from
SiB experiments support this hypothesis: surprise distractors that
generated a blink were linked not only to TPJ activity but also
to activity in the inferior frontal junction (IFJ), a key locus in
coordinating the interplay of stimulus-driven and goal-directed
attention (Dux et al., 2006; Asplund et al., 2010b).
Despite the potential role of the TPJ in the SiB, it may not be
critical for directing attention to emotionally salient events. The
ventral attention network generally does not respond to salient,
behaviorally irrelevant stimuli in a prolonged manner (Indovina
and Macaluso, 2007; Corbetta et al., 2008), yet the EAB lasts
for many trials. Indeed, in their study of the SiB, Asplund et al.
(2010b) found that although surprise distractors elicited greater
TPJ activity when they captured attention, both the behavioral
index of attentional capture and TPJ activity rapidly habituated.
Of note, while the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
responded to surprise distractors, they did not track attentional
capture as measured by behavior. Given the divergence of the SiB
and EAB as described above, additional work is needed to deter-
mine whether the TPJ plays a role in the EAB, and how this and
other ventral attention regions interact with the amygdala and
OFC in the presence of emotional distractors during RSVP.
Given the paucity of studies examining the neural substrates
of the EAB, it is worth considering how findings from emo-
tional variants of the standard AB task might relate to the EAB.
A growing body of literature indicates that a network of regions
including the amygdala, rostral anterior cingulate, thalamus, mid-
dle frontal cortex, and higher order visual areas contribute to
the enhanced detection of emotional T2s during the AB win-
dow (Anderson and Phelps, 2001; Keil et al., 2006; De Martino
et al., 2009; Lim et al., 2009; Padmala and Pessoa, 2010). The
emotional standard AB finding most closely related to the EAB
comes from a study by Schwabe et al. (2010) in which both T1
and T2 could be emotional or neutral. Critically, this manipula-
tion allows assessment of activity both in response to emotional
T1 that impair processing of subsequent T2 (somewhat analogous
to the EAB) and emotional T2 that “break through” the AB. The
authors found no evidence of amygdala activation when emo-
tional T1 stimuli caused participants to miss T2 (either emotional
or neutral). However, the AI, lateral OFC and dorsal anterior cin-
gulate (dACC) were more active when an emotional T1 word
impaired T2 identification compared to when T2 were correctly
reported. These data suggest that anterior components of the
ventral attention network such as the AI may play a more impor-
tant role than posterior areas in orienting attention to distracting
emotional cues and driving attention effects. Although the task
is not a perfect match to EAB studies in that T1 was goal rele-
vant, the absence of amygdala activation supports the possibility
that extra-amygdalar neural circuits play a role in the EAB. Future
FMRI studies are necessary to better understand whether the cir-
cuits involved in emotional target detection play a role in the
EAB. Finally, emotional T2 detection during the standard AB
is enhanced by increasing endogenous levels of norepinephrine
(De Martino et al., 2008). This finding is particularly intriguing
given a hypothesis proposed by Aston-Jones and Cohen (2005)
that firing of norepinephrine-producing neurons of the locus
coeruleus is responsible for the AB. It would be of interest to
examine whether the EAB is similarly subject to noradrenergic
modulation.
DISENGAGEMENT AND DELAYED ENHANCEMENT OF
ATTENTION
While the natural focus of the EAB paradigm is the disruptive
effect of stimulus-driven attention, by measuring the length of
time (lag number) at which individuals return to baseline perfor-
mance (equivalent to neutral or no distractor trials), it is possible
to obtain a metric of how long it takes an individual to disen-
gage from an emotional stimulus and reassert top-down control
of attention. Alternatively, in a study with just an early and a
late lag, a disengagement efficiency index can be calculated by
simply taking the difference in accuracy between an early and
a late lag performance (e.g., lag 8 performance—lag 2 perfor-
mance) (Olatunji et al., 2011b). In our past studies subjects show
the largest disengagement efficiency for erotic images, reflecting a
large blink at lag 2, but a strong ability to disengage and reassert
top-down control at lag 8.
At long distractor-target delays, performance may reflect more
than just disengagement. In the original studies of the EAB,
lag 8 was treated as equivalent to baseline, and indeed there
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was no overall difference between neutral and aversive targets
at this time point. However, in some samples, we and others
have observed that performance is modestly improved follow-
ing emotionally salient stimuli relative to neutral stimuli at lag
8 or longer lags, with notable individual differences in the mag-
nitude of the effect (Bocanegra and Zeelenberg, 2009; Ciesielski
et al., 2010). Bocanegra and Zeelenberg (2009) have referred to
this type of late enhancement as emotional hypervision. They
reason based on a two-stage bottleneck model that an emo-
tional cue could trigger an enhancement during stage 1 process-
ing that could allow for a facilitation of processing that carries
over onto targets that are temporally far enough removed from
the initial target (or distractor) so as to not be in competi-
tion. In other words, if such an enhancement at the stage 1
level lasts longer than the stage 2 bottleneck’s refractory period,
it will produce a period of improved detection at lags slightly
longer than the typical length of the EAB effect. Bocanegra and
Zeelenberg (2009) suggest that a single common source of emo-
tional modulation could produce both the EAB and emotional
hypervision effects through simultaneous influences on stage 1
and stage 2 processes. The parsimony of this model has appeal,
as it requires only a single stimulus-driven process. There is
however an alternative possibility in which hypervision effects
during RSVP paradigms are not caused by the same mecha-
nisms as the EAB, but rather reflect a distinct, independent
source of stage 1 enhancement that is slower and longer last-
ing than the stage 2 bottleneck’s refractory period. The relative
slowness of the effect could reflect a multisynaptic pathway that
requires more time for stimulus evaluation before it can mod-
ulate stage 1 perceptual processing. Regardless of the specific
mechanism, assessment of individual differences in performance
at intermediate and longer lags may provide useful informa-
tion regarding the mental chronometry of emotion-attention
interactions.
EAB SENSITIVITY AND ANXIETY
Cognitive and neural models highlight the role of dysregulated
attentional processes in the etiology of anxiety (Eysenck et al.,
2007; Bishop, 2008) In a series of studies, we have used the
EAB to measure the extent to which individuals with different
anxiety disorders exhibit increased attentional capture or dif-
ficulty disengaging from concern-relevant stimuli. Recent data
from patients with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is per-
haps the most striking result from these studies. Attentional
biases that automatically direct attention to trauma-relevant
cues have been argued to play a key role in the maintenance
of PTSD (Ehlers and Clark, 2000). Combined with a gen-
eral hypervigilance, preferential attention to threat may lead
to heightened fear responding to cues and repeated accessing
of trauma-related memories. In a recent study employing the
EAB paradigm, we observed that combat-exposed veterans with
PTSD showed a powerful EAB for combat images relative to
both healthy controls and combat exposed veterans without
PTSD (Olatunji et al., 2012). Disgust and positive distractors
evoked EABs in the PTSD veterans that were comparable to those
observed in non-PTSD veterans and healthy controls, suggest-
ing the absence of global hypervigilance. As discussed previously,
the EAB is sensitive to current stimulus value (Smith et al.,
2006). Future studies examining the extent to which the EAB is
modulated following gold standard interventions for PTSD such
as prolonged exposure therapy (Powers et al., 2010) would be
informative.
By contrast, patients with obsessive compulsive disorder
(OCD) have shown relatively normal levels of attentional capture
at lag 2, but problems related to disengagement and the reestab-
lishment of top-down attentional control at lag 8 (Olatunji et al.,
2011b). This problem with disengagement emerged across emo-
tional stimuli (reflected in a low disengagement efficiency index),
but was most notable for erotic images. This may reflect a dis-
order specific concern (related to guilt or moral scrupulousness),
or may reflect measurement sensitivity (since erotica consistently
produces the most robust levels of attentional capture across
samples, it provides the biggest challenge for disengagement
mechanisms).
Patients with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) displayed
heightened attention to threat-related distractors at both short
and long lags relative to healthy controls, consistent with elevated
threat sensitivity (Olatunji et al., 2011a). However, the data from
this study indicate that GAD is also associated with a reduced
ability to recruit attentional control in response to neutral distrac-
tors, which may suggest the presence of a more general problem
in attentional control that extends beyond the emotion domain.
Indeed, in that study GAD patients reported significantly lower
attentional control on a self-report measure, and the relation-
ship between task performance for neutral stimuli and GAD
diagnosis was shown to be mediated by attentional control as
assessed by the Attention Control Scale (Derryberry and Reed,
2002).
CONCLUSION
In summary, the EAB paradigm provides a robust and unique
behavioralmeasure of the ability of emotional stimuli to preferen-
tially capture attentional resources in a stimulus-driven manner.
EAB effects can be characterized in relation to a two-stage bot-
tleneck model of attention, and provide the ability to examine
the mental chronometry of emotion-attention interactions. Data
on the neural mechanisms of the EAB remain scarce, but current
evidence suggests that the ventral frontoparietal attention net-
work involved in stimulus-driven attention plays a critical role.
Given the sensitivity of the EAB paradigm for detecting specific
alterations in attentional capture and disengagement in anxiety
disorders, the further delineation of the neural basis of the EAB
may prove fruitful for identifying mechanisms underlying unique
aspects of anxiety pathophysiology. Such research may lead to
not only a better understanding of the neural correlates of psy-
chopathological processes in these disorders, but could provide
a useful biomarker for clinical treatment studies, especially those
that explicitly attempt to alter attentional biases (Schmidt et al.,
2009; Bar-Haim, 2010; Hakamata et al., 2010).
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